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Abstract:  
Quantum key distribution (QKD) together with one time pad encoding can provide information-theoretical security for 
communication. Currently, though QKD has been widely deployed in many metropolitan fiber networks, its 
implementation in a large scale remains experimentally challenging. This letter provides a brief review on the 
experimental efforts towards the goal of global QKD, including the security of practical QKD with imperfect devices, 
QKD metropolitan and backbone networks over optical fiber and satellite-based QKD over free space. 
 
1. Introduction 
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2], together with one time pad (OTP) [3] method, provides 
a secure means of communication with information-theoretical security based on the basic 
principle of quantum mechanics. Light is a natural and optimal candidate for the realization of 
QKD due to its flying nature and its compatibility with today’s fiber-based telecom network. 
The ultimate goal of the field is to realize a global QKD network for worldwide applications. 
Tremendous efforts have been put towards this goal [4–6]. Despite significant progresses over 
the past decades, there are still two major challenges for large-scale QKD network.  
The first challenge is the gap between the theory and the practice in the actual 
implementations of QKD [6]. QKD is ideally secure only when it employs perfect single-
photon sources and detectors. Unfortunately, ideal devices never exist in practice. As a result, 
device imperfections may raise security loopholes or side channels, which can break the 
security of practical QKD [7–13]. A solution is to design protocols that can be secure against 
device imperfections. Several such protocols have been proposed [14–22] and the ones that 
have been widely demonstrated in experiments are decoy-state QKD [19–21] and 
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD [22].   
The second challenge is to go large scale, which has high channel loss and decoherence. 
Current distance record in fiber for QKD is 404 km [23]. At a distance of 1000 km fiber, one 
would detect only 0.3 photons per century, even with 10 GHz ideal single photon source and 
perfect single photon detectors. Very recently, a new proposed protocol is proposed to extend 
the distance to around 500 km [24], the key rate, however, will still drop down dramatically in 
long distance. One solution to this challenge is quantum repeater [25]. Although a 
demonstration of 500 km quantum repeater can be expected in several years [26], its real 
application still suffers from the limited performance of quantum memory [25]. A temporary 
replacement to the quantum repeater is the trustful relay scheme, which can be deployed within 
current technology but requires a careful protection on all the relay nodes [27]. Meanwhile, 
considering the much less channel loss and negligible decoherence in the space, satellite-based 
quantum communication is believed to be a more promising solution and has achieved lots of 
progresses very recently [28-30].  
In this letter, we briefly review the experimental efforts over the past 30 years in solving 
the two challenges for global QKD. Session 2 discusses practically secure QKD with a focus 
on decoy-state and MDI QKD. Session 3 describes the efforts in fiber-based QKD networks 
that include metropolitan networks and backbone networks based on trustful relays. Session 4 
reviews the very recent satellite-based QKD experiments. Session 5 provides an outlook to the 
global quantum communication.  
2. Secure QKD with imperfect devices 
The best-known QKD protocol is the BB84 scheme invented by Charles Bennett and Gilles 
Brassard in 1984 [1]. In this protocol, Alice (the sender) encodes her random numbers into a 
sequence of single photons prepared in different polarization states, which are chosen from two 
conjugate bases (rectilinear and diagonal basis), and sends the photons through the channel, 
fiber or free space link, to Bob (the receiver). Bob measures each incoming photon using one 
of the two conjugate bases. Next, Alice and Bob perform the basis reconciliation via 
broadcasting their basis choices via an authenticated classical channel and discard all data 
associated with signals prepared and measured in different bases. They sacrifice a randomly 
chosen portion of the remaining data to estimate the quantum bit error rate (QBER). If this 
quantity is larger than some prescribed threshold value, they abort the protocol. Otherwise, 
Alice and Bob use classical post-processing techniques (such as error correction and privacy 
amplification) to generate a secret key. Besides BB84, the other important QKD protocol is the 
entanglement based protocol proposed in 1991 by Artur Ekert [2]. Here we will focus on the 
BB84 protocol to discuss its security in real circumstance. 
The security of BB84 is based on the quantum no-cloning theorem: an unknown quantum 
state cannot be perfectly copied. However, in actual implementations, the security proofs of 
QKD must take the theoretical models of the underlying implementation devices into 
consideration [15]. In general, the security proof leaves the channel to Eve [5], who can do 
anything over the channel as long as the physics law allows, even it is beyond the current 
technology. For the sender and the receiver, the security proof requires that the devices 
exploited in the experiment must be the same as the theoretical model. The later, however, 
could not be satisfied in practical circumstances, and it will leave a back door for Eve to hack 
practical QKD. 
The first well known quantum hacking strategy is photon number splitting (PNS) attack 
[31,32], aiming at the imperfect photon source.  The BB84 protocol requires ideal single photon 
source, which, however, does not exist with current technology. The current single photon 
source is generally bulky, expensive and low efficient. Instead, weak coherent pulses generated 
by highly attenuated lasers are widely exploited in QKD implementations. Since the photon 
number of a phase-randomized weak coherent pulse follows the Poisson distribution, there is 
still a probability for 2 or more photons in a pulse. Eve may exploit the multiple-photon pulses 
and launch the PNS attack. In this attack, Eve utilizes quantum non-demolition measurement 
to obtain the photon number information, blocks the 1-photon pulse and splits the pulse into 
two for multiple-photon pulse. Then, she keeps one part of the multiple-photon pulse and sends 
the other part to Bob. Later, she can get the key value during the basis-reconciliation process. 
In this case, Alice and Bob could not be aware of Eve’s existence. The PNS attack limits the 
distance for QKD below 30 km [15]. Actually, in early 2000s, a few groups [33,34] have 
implemented QKD up to the range of 100 km with weak coherent pulses, but those systems are 
insecure under PNS attack.  
Many QKD protocols were proposed to defend the PNS attack in early 2000. In particular, 
the discovery of decoy state method [19–21] made weak coherent lasers much more appealing 
to implement secure BB84 over long distance. In decoy state QKD, Alice prepares some decoy 
states in addition to the standard state – signal state – used in initial BB84. The decoy states are 
the same as the signal state, except for the expected photon number. Those decoy states are 
used for detecting Eve’s attacks only, whereas the signal state is used for key generation. Each 
of Alice’s pulses is assigned to either signal state or decoy state randomly. Alice then modulates 
the intensity of each pulse and sends it to Bob. After Bob acknowledges the receipt of all the 
signals, Alice tells Bob over an authenticated classical channel which states are signal states. 
The statistical characteristics can be analyzed.  
 Fig. 1. (a) Decoy state QKD experiment over 100 km over fiber [36]. (b) Decoy state QKD 
experiment over 144 km over free space [38]. 
Several experimental groups have demonstrated that decoy state BB84 is secure and 
feasible under real-world conditions. Rosenberg et al. [35] and Peng et al. [Fig. 1(a)] [36] 
implement decoy state QKD through 100 km fiber, for the first time overcoming the PNS-
attack-limited distance of 30 km. Note that, before the two experiments, decoy state QKD 
protocol has been demonstrated, which, however goes through a 15 km fiber spool [37], still 
less than 30 km. Later on, Schmitt-Manderbach et al. achieved 144 km decoy state QKD in free 
space [Fig. 1(b)] [38]. Since then, people have started to believe that QKD can be really secure 
with imperfect devices, and more and more experimental efforts have been made to QKD 
deployments in labs and field tests [39–41].  
After resolving the PNS attack in the source, however, researchers started to study the 
loopholes in the detection side. From 2008 to 2011, several attacks against detectors have been 
demonstrated successfully in experiment against both research-based and commercial QKD 
systems. These attacks include the time-shift attack [7], detector blinding attack [9,10], dead 
time attack [11] and so forth [12,13]. Here, we take the detector blinding attack [9] as an 
example. In actual QKD implementations, the most widely used detectors by Bob are single 
photon avalanched diode (SPAD). When the input intensity is at single photon level, the SPAD 
works properly at Geiger mode. Nonetheless, when the input intensity increases, the detector 
will turn blind and enter linear-mode operation, i.e., the output is proportional to the input 
optical power. Consequently, Eve can exploit this feature to attack the QKD system. As shown 
in Figure 2(a), Eve can perform an intercept-and-resend attack by intercepting the pulses sent 
from Alice and measuring them. Then, Eve first sends a strong light to blind all Bob’s detectors 
to linear mode, and then according to her measurement result, she sends another light at a 
tailored intensity to Bob such that Bob’s detectors can fire only when he selects the same basis 
as Eve. By doing so, Eve can successfully steal the key information without being noticed.  
So far, a viable solution to the detection attacks is the MDI-QKD [22]. As shown in Figure 
2(b), MDI-QKD generates secret keys based on the time-reversed entanglement protocol [42,43] 
and leaves all the single photon detections to a public untrusted measurement platform (Eve). 
In MDI-QKD, both Alice and Bob are senders, and they transmit signals to an untrusted third 
party, Eve, who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement (BSM). Such a measurement 
provides post-selected entanglement that can be verified by Alice and Bob. Since the 
measurement setting is only used to post-select entanglement, it can be treated as an entirely 
black box. Hence, MDI-QKD can remove all detection side-channels. Furthermore, MDI-QKD 
can be implemented with weak coherent lasers and it is practical with present technology. 
 
a b
 Fig. 2. (a) An illustration of the intercept-and-resend attacks against detectors (figure adopted 
from [44]). (b) An illustration of the MDI-QKD protocol [22]. (c) Schematic diagram of the 
longest MDI-QKD experiment over 404 km fiber [23]. (d) Schematic diagram of the fastest 
MDI-QKD experiment with 1 GHz clock rate [52].  
In 2013, three experimental groups implemented MDI-QKD independently [44–46]. Liu et 
al. [44] achieved the first demonstration of MDI-QKD with random modulation for encoding 
states and decoy states. Simultaneously, Rubenok et al., demonstrated the feasibility of two-
photon interference in a field test [45] and Ferreira da Silva et al., provided a two independent 
laser interference test in the lab [46]. Both groups also performed a partial MDI-QKD 
experiment, though without random modulation. Later, Tang et al., provided a full 
demonstration of MDI-QKD with polarization encoding qubits [47]. Wang et al., demonstrated 
a reference-frame-independent MDI-QKD [48] and Tang et al., demonstrated MDI-QKD with 
source flaws [49].  
MDI-QKD is attractive not only because of its security against detection attacks, but also 
due to its practicality. It can resist high channel loss and reach long distance. Tang et al., 
implemented MDI-QKD over 200 km fiber [50] by increasing the system clock rate from 1 
MHz to 75 MHz and utilizing superconducting single photon detectors. Meanwhile, Valivarthi 
et al., analyzed the practical issues associated with the implementation of MDI-QKD [51].  
Very recently, Yin et al., extended the MDI-QKD distance to 404 km low loss fiber by 
optimizing the parameter and using a low-loss fiber (0.16 dB/km)  [Fig. 2(c)] [23]. Importantly, 
the key rate achieved in the experiment at 100 km is around 3 kbps [23], which is sufficient for 
one-time-pad encoding of voice message. Meanwhile, Comandar et al., increased the clock rate 
of MDI-QKD to 1 GHz by exploiting optical seed lasers [Fig. 2(d)] [52]. Despite no random 
modulation on the encoding states, the 1 GHz system demonstrates the feasibility for MDI-
QKD to reach 1 Mbps key rate. With all these experimental efforts, MDI-QKD is practical and 
suitable for metropolitan QKD network.   
The above-mentioned protocols are discrete-variable QKD schemes. Another interesting 
option is to use continuous-variable (CV) QKD [53,54]. CV-QKD has been realized up to 100 
km fiber under the security assumption of restricted (collective) attacks [55,56]. Recent theory 
has proved CV-QKD against general attacks [57–60], but the transmission distance in this case 
is highly limited [58]. On the practical security side, a major security loophole is the transmitted 
local oscillator from Alice to Bob, however the recent achievements on locally generated local-
oscillator [61–63] provide a viable solution. Furthermore, to remove detector side channels, 
Pirandola et al., proposed and demonstrated a proof-of-principle CV MDI-QKD [64], but a full 
implementation is still a challenge in experiment. 
3. QKD network over optical fiber: metropolitan and backbone 
The immediate application of QKD is secure communication over metropolitan optical fiber 
network. The first reported QKD field test over optical fiber was implemented by BT Lab in 
Suffolk, UK [65,66], which had 4 users with one Alice and three Bobs. The quantum signal 
(weak coherent pulse) sent from Alice is split into three portions by two passive beam-splitters, 
and then the three portions are detected by three Bobs, respectively. The length for the fiber 
link is around several kilometers and the secure key rate is around 1 kbps.  
The first QKD network was built in 2003 supported by DARPA [67] in the city of Boston 
in USA. This network is a mixture of both fiber link (with optical switches) and free space link, 
and it is also a mixture of weak coherent state BB84 and entanglement based protocols. Later 
on, European fiber-based QKD network -- SECOQC -- was built in Vienna [68], and Tokyo 
network were reported [69]. Both networks have 6 nodes and contain multiple types of QKD 
protocols, including plug&play scheme, decoy state BB84, entanglement-based protocol, 
coherent one way (COW),  differential phase shift (DPS), and continuous-variable (CV) 
protocol. Moreover, in both networks, beyond point-to-point link, trusted relays were used to 
connect remote users. In the trusted relay scenario, Alice and Bob respectively shared a secret 
key with a trusted relay in the middle, and then the relay will announce the XOR results of both 
keys publicly. With the announced result, Alice and Bob can figure out each other’s key. The 
negative side for this method is that both Alice and Bob must trust the relay and the relay needs 
to be physically isolated well, while the positive side is reducing the cost and complexity as 
compared to the all connected point-to-point links and extending the transmission distance.  
In 2009, a QKD network for real-life applications was demonstrated at the city of Hefei, 
China [70,71], where the voice signal of telephone was encoded and decoded by quantum keys 
together with the OTP method. Besides the OTP encryption, quantum keys were also combined 
with Advanced Encryption Standard (ASE) system, which can substantially increase the 
communication rate but at the cost of less security comparing to OTP. In addition, the Swiss 
quantum network in Geneva [72] and the Durban network in South Africa [73] reported the 
field test of QKD applications based on the plug&play BB84 QKD system.  Furthermore, a 
wide area QKD network across three cities and two metropolitan areas with over 150 kilometers 
coverage area in China was reported [74]. Conventional QKD network architecture was 
reversed, where the detectors -- the most expensive components of a QKD setup -- are given to 
the central node and the users need only transmitters [75]. 
 
Fig. 3. (a) An outline of Beijing-Shanghai 2000 km backbone QKD network [27]. (b) The 
topology of Jinan metropolitan QKD network. (c) MDI-QKD network with three user nodes and 
one untrusted relay node [91].  
Wavelength division multiplexing (WDM) is an important technique in fiber-based QKD 
network for optical routing [76,77] and the integration with conventional telecom network. In 
particular, the integration (or coexistence) between QKD and classical telecom data on a single 
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fiber can significantly reduce the cost and increase the robustness in practical applications of 
QKD. The scheme of simultaneously transmitting QKD with conventional data was first 
introduced by Townsend in 1997 [78]. After that, several QKD experiments demonstrated the 
feasibility of integrating various QKD protocols with classical telecom channels [79–85]. Very 
recently, a QKD integrated with 3.6 Tbps traffic optical communication data over 66 km 
backbone field fiber has been demonstrated [86]. 
So far, QKD over metropolitan area has been widely deployed. Like the optical fiber 
telecom communication, the next step is to apply QKD to backbone optical fiber network for 
large-scale secure communications. The channel loss and decoherence in optical fiber, however, 
will reduce the intensity and fidelity of the quantum signal exponentially. Unlike the classical 
optical communication, the unknown quantum signal cannot be perfectly cloned (no-cloning 
theorem) or amplified without introducing errors. In that sense, classical optical repeater 
method does not work in quantum communication. As a result, loss distance QKD network is 
a great challenge. 
Quantum repeater is thought to be one of the feasible solutions [87,88]. Although 
tremendous progresses have been made towards this solution, the deployment of a practical 
quantum repeater is still believed to be beyond current technology [89,90].  
Another feasible solution in optical fiber is using trusted relays. Remarkably, China has 
built the world’s longest quantum secure communication backbone network, from Beijing to 
Shanghai, with a fiber distance exceeding 2000 km [Fig. 3(a)] [27]. As shown in Figure 3(a), 
this backbone network includes 32 nodes in total. The backbone network connects four 
metropolitan networks, namely Beijing, Jinan, Hefei and Shanghai. Each metropolitan network 
has more than 10 nodes and different topology. As an example, the topology of Jinan 
metropolitan QKD network is shown in Fig. 3(b). During the operation of the Beijing-Shanghai 
backbone network, QKD is implemented between every two adjacent nodes and at each node, 
there is no quantum repeater or memory. All the 32 nodes are trusted nodes, which implement 
XOR operation with their received keys and pass on the quantum key along the line. The 
Beijing-Shanghai backbone network, together with the four metropolitan networks, is valuable 
for practical applications. Indeed, currently real-world applications in banks, securities, and 
insurances are on trial.  
All the metropolitan and backbone QKD networks reviewed so far rely on trusted relays, 
which require that each relay node should be strictly secure. Hence, the physical isolation of 
the trusted nodes must be investigated, which is fatal for secure communication. A dream for 
future QKD network is using untrusted replays. In fact, the aforementioned MDI-QKD protocol 
provides such possibility. MDI-QKD is naturally fits a “star” type of fiber telecom network 
over untrusted reply, in which the untrusted Bell state measurement (BSM) can be placed on a 
network server in the middle and all the surrounding users just need simple transmitters that 
send quantum signals to the network server [6]. Any two users, who want to share secret keys 
via QKD, will be routed to the BSM upon their requests via an optical switch. Usually, the most 
expensive part of a QKD system is single photon detector in the receiver side. In this way, most 
of the nodes in the MDI-QKD network are senders and the entire system cost can be also 
reduced. Tang et al., performed the first implementation of such MDI-QKD network in the 
Hefei city [91], which has a star topology and four nodes with one relay node and three-user 
nodes [Fig. 3(c)]. The central relay node needs not to be trustful in MDI-QKD network. In 
practice, if the central relay can be trusted, one can reconfigure the MDI-QKD network to allow 
many quantum communication protocols [92,93]. Overall, among the various kinds of QKD 
protocols, we do believe that the MDI-QKD network will be an important choice for the future 
metropolitan QKD networks.  
4. Satellite-based QKD 
In general, secret key rate of QKD scales linearly with the channel transmittance, which 
severely limits its feasible transmission distance. As an example, QKD in standard telecomm 
fiber with an attenuation of ~0.2 dB/km over 1000 km results in a  channel transmittance of 
10−20 , making the secret key rate highly low and impractical. In contrast, atmospheric 
attenuation in free space is less significant than in fiber. In particular, the attenuation is even 
negligible in the vacuum above the Earth’s atmosphere whose effective vertical thickness is 
approximately 5-10 km from the ground. Therefore, an alternative and promising way to long 
distance QKD is to use satellites as intermediate trusted nodes for communication between 
locations on the ground -- satellite-based QKD.  As long as the quantum states can survive after 
penetrating the Earth’s atmosphere, satellite-based QKD can be far superior and more efficient 
than fiber links, thus offering a unique approach for quantum communication on a global scale.  
In fact, the very first proof-of-concept experiment in the research field of QKD was done 
in free space over a link of 32 cm [Fig. 4(a)] [94]. Since then, tremendous progress that has 
been made in QKD experiments over free space in both laboratory and outdoor environment. 
Early experiments near 2000 had demonstrated the feasibility of free-space QKD over 
kilometer-scale distance [95–97]. In 2002, two groups independently reported the successful 
demonstration of QKD over distances of 10 km [Fig. 4(b)] [98] and 23.4 km [Fig. 4(c)] [99]. 
In 2005, Peng et al. distributed entangled photons over a two-link free-space channel to two 
locations separated by 10.5 km [Fig. 4(d)] [100]. Later, one-link transfer of triggered single 
photons over free-space channel of 7.8 km was reported [101]. These achievements proved for 
the first time that the quantum states, even entanglement, can still survive after penetrating the 
aerosphere vertically, and thus confirming the feasibility of satellite-based free-space quantum 
communication.  
Note that the previous free-space experiments demonstrated only that QKD could survive 
after the absorption of the atmosphere. However, besides the absorption loss, there are also 
geometrical loss, optical loss, coupling loss and so forth. The total channel loss between a low 
Earth orbit (LEO) satellite and the Earth, or between LEO satellites, is typically around 40-45 
dB [102,103]. Moreover, in previous experiments, QKD was only realized between two 
stationary sites, which could not simulate the real link between a fast moving satellite and the 
ground station.   
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Fig. 4. (a) The first QKD demonstration over a free space link of 32 cm [94]. (b) Free-space 
QKD experiment over 10 km [98]. (c) Free-space QKD experiment over 23.4 km [99]. (d) Free-
space distribution of entangled photons over 10.5 km [100] (e) Entanglement distribution over 
100 km free space link [105]. (f) Quantum teleportation over 143 km free space link [106]. 
With the developments of the technologies towards the goal of satellite-based QKD 
realization, a series of ground tests have been performed to demonstrate the feasibility of 
satellite-based quantum communication before launching the real satellite. Free-space 
distribution of entanglement and decoy-state QKD were achieved over 144 km link in 2007 
[104,38], where a secure key generation rate of 12.8 bit/s over an attenuation of about 35 dB 
was demonstrated in the decoy-state QKD experiment [Fig. 1(d)]. In 2012, through a two-link 
free-space channel with channel lengths of 51.2 km and 52.2 km respectively, entangled 
photons were distributed by more than 100 km [Fig. 4(e)] [105]. Moreover, two groups 
independently reported the teleportation of quantum states over a distance of more than 100 km 
free-space link [Fig. 4(f)] [105,106].  
Direct and full-scale experimental verifications have been performed towards the goal of 
satellite-based QKD for moving platforms [107]. In this experiment, the system was operated 
in a moving platform through a turntable and floating platform of hot-air balloon over a huge 
lossy channel, for substantiating performances under rapid motion, altitude change and 
vibration, random movement of satellites and in high-loss regime, which covers almost all the 
leading parameters of a typical LEO satellite. Meanwhile, Nauerth et al. reported the 
remarkable demonstration of QKD between an airplane and a ground station [108]. Later, a 
direct demonstration of the satellite-ground transmission of a quasi-single-photon source, 
which is generated by reflecting weak laser pulses back to earth with a cube-corner retro-
reflector on the existing satellite, was reported [109]. In 2015, quantum communication from 
space to ground via the in-orbit satellite corner cube retroreflectors was demonstrated by G. 
Vallone et al. [110]. 
 
Fig. 5. (a) An overview of the satellite-to-ground QKD [28]. The decoy BB84 transmitter is on 
the satellite to perform downlink QKD and the receiver is located at Xinglong observatory 
station. (b) Link efficiencies comparison between direct transmission through 
telecommunication optical fibers (red) and the satellite-to-ground approach (blue) [28]. (c) 
Intercontinental QKD between China and Europe [111]. (d) An illustration of global QKD with 
LEO satellites and geosynchronous equatorial orbit (GEO) satellites [112]. 
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In August 2016, the first quantum science satellite -- Micius -- was launched in Jiuquan, 
China, which is a LEO satellite orbiting at an altitude of about 500 km. As is shown in Fig. 5(a), 
a decoy-state QKD transmitter is equipped on one of the Micius satellite payload, and it 
performs downlink QKD by sending the quantum signals to the receiver located at Xinglong 
ground station (40°23045.1200N, 117°34038.8500E). The decoy-state QKD was demonstrated 
with polarization encoding from the satellite to the ground, with 1 kbps rate over a distance of 
up to 1200 km [28]. The QKD experiment was performed on 23 different days, and the quantum 
bit error rates and secure key rates varied with the distance and weather in different days. Fig. 
5(b) compared the optical link efficiency over distances ranging from 645 km to 1200 km 
between the satellite-based QKD and the conventional method of direct transmission through 
optical telecommunication fibers. Despite the short coverage time (273 s per day) and the need 
for reasonably good weather conditions using the Micius satellite, a substantial enhancement 
in efficiency compared to telecommunication fibers was observed. At 1200 km, the channel 
efficiency of the satellite-based QKD over the 273-s coverage time is about 20 orders of 
magnitudes higher than previously reported QKD experiments using optical fiber. Meanwhile, 
based on the Micius quantum satellite, the ground to satellite quantum teleportation [29] and 
the satellite-based entanglement distribution over 1200 km were also demonstrated [30]. 
Later, the Micius quantum satellite was used as a trusted relay to distribute secure keys 
between multiple remote locations in China and Europe [Fig. 5(c)] [111]. The three cooperating 
ground stations were located at Xinglong, Nanshan (43°28031.6600N, 87°10036.0700E), and 
Graz (47°401.7200N, 15°29035.9200E). The distances from Xinglong to Nanshan and to Graz 
were 2500 km and 7600 km, respectively. In this experiment, Micius flied along a Sun-
synchronized orbit, which circled Earth every 94 min. Each night starting at around 0:50 a.m. 
local time, Micius passed over the three ground stations allowing for downlink QKD in a 
duration of ∼300 s. Under reasonably good weather conditions, sifted key rates of ∼3 kbps at 
∼1000 km physical separation distance and ∼9 kbps at ∼600 km distance (at the maximal 
elevation angle) could be routinely obtained. Therefore, using the Micius quantum satellite as 
a trusted relay, the first intercontinental quantum communication was established successfully. 
5. Outlook of the future global QKD 
In summary, the decoy state QKD and the MDI-QKD provide viable and practical solutions for 
imperfect source and detectors to realize practically secure QKD in experiment. A simple 
prototype for a global quantum communication network based on satellite and backbone fiber 
network has been demonstrated. In the future, more and more backbone and metropolitan fiber 
QKD networks are expected to be built in China and Europe for applications. To increase the 
coverage time and area for a more efficient satellite-based QKD network, one can launch 
higher-orbit quantum satellites and implement QKD in daytime using telecommunication 
wavelength photons and tighter spatial and spectral filtering [Fig. 5(d)] [112]. One limitation 
of the current implementation of the global QKD is that the satellite itself should be trusted. 
This can be overcome in the future using entanglement-based QKD systems [30,113] or MDI-
QKD fiber networks. In the long run, device independent QKD [16,17] could be implemented 
based on the loophole-free Bell test where the users do not even need to trust their 
implementation devices, though it seems still not practical with current technology. 
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